Stock market reaction to mega-sport events : evidence from South Africa and Morocco by Gopane, Thabo J. & Mmotla, Reggy M.
0 
 
 
STOCK MARKET REACTION TO MEGA-SPORT EVENTS:  
Evidence from South Africa and Morocco 
 
Thabo J. Gopane1 and Reggy M. Mmotla2 
 
1. University of Johannesburg. 
2. First National Bank. 
 
Thabo J. Gopane is a lecturer in the Department of Finance and Investment Management 
based at Soweto Campus. His research interests include sport economics, digital finance, 
and applied econometrics. 
 
Reggy M. Mmotla is a risk manager at First National Bank, one of the top three banks in 
South Africa, and specialised in financial economics from the College of Business and 
Economics in the University of Johannesburg. 
 
 
Abstract 
This article investigated the stock price reaction to the news of South Africa’s winning the 
opportunity to host the 1995 Rugby World Cup, 2003 Cricket World Cup, and 2010 FIFA 
World Cup, as well as Morocco’s concurrently losing a competitive bid to host the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup. We used Event Study Methodology, and EGARCH models. In Event Study, the 
normal market performance is evaluated using 250 daily stock returns in the pre-event 
period, while abnormal returns are tested within a 41-day (-20, +20) event window. The test 
was replicated using 2 227 daily compounded stock returns for the EGARCH model to re-
test the stock market reaction to the news of hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup for bid winner 
(South Africa) and bid loser (Morocco). On aggregate, based on both the Event Study and 
EGARCH models, our findings convey a consistent message that the stock market 
responded positively to the hosting of mega-sport events for the bid winner (South Africa), 
and reacted negatively to the bid loser (Morocco). The results are statistically significant at 
conventional test levels. The findings support policy decisions that welcome mega-sport 
events. 
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Introduction 
Hosting a major international event like the FIFA World Cup bestows a country and its 
government with status, prestige, influence, power and foreign investment (Van Wyk, 2008, p.2) 
 
 
The news that a country has won a competitive bid to host a major international sport 
tournament is considered unanticipated information, since no one has prior knowledge of the 
bid outcome (or winner) until the decision envelope is opened publicly on the announcement 
day.  Similar to the release of other economic indicators, Godinho and Cerqueira (2018) has 
confirmed that unexpected sport outcomes have potential to induce stock market reactions.  
In order to study the stock market’s response to the announcement of hosting mega-sport 
events in South Africa and Morocco, this article applied the efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH) of Fama (1965, 1970, 1991); the theory of rational expectations (Muth, 1961); the 
stock returns’ predictability hypothesis (Golez & Koudijs, 2018); and Event Study 
Methodology, comprehensively reviewed by MacKinlay (1997). 
 
Prior to 1995, no World Cup tournament in rugby, cricket or soccer had been hosted in 
Africa, let alone in South Africa, despite the continent’s active participation in these sports. 
Since then there has been a change of mind-set by international sport bodies with a new 
policy decision to promote sport beyond the usual hosting venues of Europe, North America, 
Asia, and Latin America. A recent research momentum has enquired whether such a 
decision is a pure public relations gesture or whether the financial markets discern potential 
value-add from the hosting of mega-sport events. 
 
The Mega-Sport Event and World Cup Competitions 
The literature on sport hosting has consensus on which sport tournaments are categorised 
as mega or major sport events. There are key features associated with mega-sport events, 
such as intensive global media coverage, as noted by Kaplanski and Levy (2010); expected 
socio-economic benefits, as reported by Cornelissen (2004) and Dollesa and Söderman 
(2008); as well as other measurable or perceived economic spill-overs as explained by 
Allmers and Maennig (2009), Antón, Alonso, and Rodríguez (2011); Gratton, Shiblik and 
Coleman (2006), Hill (2000), Kasimati (2003), Nauright (2004), as well as Roche (2000). In 
view of the above, and for the purpose of this study, mega- sport events include the Rugby 
World Cup 1995, Cricket World Cup 2003, and FIFA World Cup 2010. 
 
FIFA, the French abbreviation of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association, is an 
international soccer governing body well known for the administration of its prestigious 
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brand, the FIFA World Cup. The FIFA World Cup was inaugurated in 1930 with Uruguay as 
the first host country. Since then the tournament has been held every four years, with only 
two cancellations, in 1942 and 1946, owing to World War II. By 2026, the FIFA World Cup 
will have been hosted in twenty-two countries, once in Africa (South Africa), thrice in Asia 
(Japan/South Korea, Russia, and Qatar), and the rest in Europe, or the Americas. Africa’s 
long history of participation in the FIFA World Cup tournaments dates back to 1934 when 
Egypt reached the top 16 match finalists in Italy.  
 
After the 2002 tournament, FIFA changed the rules for hosting the tournament. An 
exhaustive ballot system is now used. In addition, a continent rotation procedure was also 
introduced in 2000 and subsequently reversed in 2007 (FIFA, 2002, 2007). Consequently, 
Africa was one of the few continents that benefited from the brief rotation system. South 
Africa and Morocco were among the countries that submitted competitive bids to host the 
2010 FIFA World Cup, and Morocco lost to South Africa. 
 
The Rugby World Cup (in its present format) has been held since 1987, and by the year 
2019 it will have been hosted by eight countries on four continents (Australia, Asia, Europe, 
and Africa). The tournament was hosted in Africa (South Africa) in 1995 for the first time 
since its installation, and South Africa won the Cup twice (in 1995 and 2007). The Cricket 
World Cup is an international championship of One Day International (ODI) cricket, and is 
governed by the ICC (International Cricket Council). In the period 1975 to 2023, thirteen 
Cricket World Cups will have been played in six countries: Australia (1992, and 2015); 
England (1975, 1979, 1983, 1999, and 2019); India (1987, 2011, and 2023); Pakistan 
(1996); and the West Indies (2007) – in no particular order. The hosting procedure for the 
Cricket World Cup appears to be by method of negotiated rotation, and not competitive 
bidding. The championship winning is dominated by Australia (five occasions), and the 
hosting mostly by England (five opportunities), while Africa (South Africa) hosted the 
tournament only once, in 2003. 
 
Why Stock Markets Respond to the News of Hosting Mega-Sport Events? 
In order for a country to win a competitive bid to host a major international sport event, such 
as the World Cup in soccer, rugby, or cricket, the country must satisfy a costly logistical 
checklist with additional expensive sweeteners. It is perhaps for this reason that an 
announcement to win such a bid creates the expectation of possible socio-economic benefits 
to the host country. The rationale of associating the hosting of mega-sport events with 
possible benefits to domestic economy is premised on the perceived positive economic 
knock-on effects linked with the necessary and extended logistics preparation. Examples 
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include improvement in safety measures, communication technology, global country 
profiling, as well as large capital expenditure on event-related infrastructure. 
Although the research on the effect of hosting of mega-sport events is inconclusive, there is 
some favourable anecdotal evidence from global experience with positive results as 
surveyed by Bohlmann and Van Heerden (2008): Los Angeles Sports and Entertainment 
Commission estimated US$32.2 million economic benefit from hosting the Olympic Games 
of 1984. The Australian URS Finance and Economics found that the Rugby World Cup 2003 
generated a contribution to GDP of AU$289 million; while the Australian Centre for Regional 
Economic Analysis estimated the economic benefit of hosting the Sydney 2000 Olympic 
Games would contribute AU$6.5 billion to GDP. 
 
Dick and Wang (2008) applied Event Study Methodology to evaluate the impact of 
announcements to host 15 Olympic Games. They found a significant positive impact on 
hosting Summer Games. This is consistent with Sharma’s (2010, p. 1027) finding that 
“countries and cities campaign actively for the rights to host major international sport 
tournaments in part because of their view that the tournaments are beneficial to their local 
economies. The announcement implies promised investments on infrastructure and other 
projects and consequently positive economic activities”.  On the contrary, a recent study by 
Engelhardt, Matheson, Yen, and Chisolm (2018) tested an extended data set of Olympic 
Games (summer and winter) for the period 1981 to 2013 and found no stock market reaction 
to the announcement of hosting bids for both winners and losers. 
 
In view of the above, the hypothesis that the hosting of mega-sport events conveys relevant 
information to stock prices remains an empirical question that requires evidence from stock 
markets around the world including Africa, and covering different kind of sports.  This type of 
investigation is particularly important in the value-add chain to understand the stylised facts 
in this research area, of event-hosting’s effect on stock markets. 
 
Hosting Mega-Sport Events and Global Stock Markets 
The appreciation of the stock market reaction to mega-sport events is one of the value-add 
applications of the EMH and a useful research link between sport economics and financial 
markets. Unfortunately, a review of the relevant literature shows that this research has been 
directed mostly at the traditional hosting of mega-sport events continents like Australia 
(Berman, Brooks, & Davidson, 2000; Nishio, Lim, & Downward, 2009); Europe (Dawson, 
Kasimati, & Veraros, 2004; Floros, 2010; Leeds, Mirikitani, & Tang, 2009; Martins & Serra, 
2011; Sterken, 2006); Asia (Dick & Wang, 2008; Liu, 2011); North America (Baade, 
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Baumann, & Matheson, 2008), to mention a few. This research needs to be extended to 
African stock markets. 
 
The only papers in South Africa that we are aware of that investigated the reaction of the 
stock market to the news of South Africa’s hosting of major sport events (the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup) are Obi, Surujlal, and Okubena (2009); and Ramdas, Van Gaalen, and Bolton  
(2015). The two papers found contradictory results. Obi et al (2009) found insignificant 
results. That is, zero stock price reaction, while Ramdas et al. (2015) found negative stock 
market reaction. This means that with this limited, and inconsistent findings, the question 
remains: Does the South African stock market respond to the hosting of mega-sport events? 
If so, what is the nature of this reaction? The presence of these unanswered questions 
signal a research gap and the current study will broaden the relevant empirical test in an 
effort to address this research question. 
 
Our paper is similar to that of Smith and Krige (2010), in that we examined the same major 
sport tournaments (1995 Rugby World Cup, 2003 Cricket World Cup, and 2010 FIFA World 
Cup), but dissimilar in that we did not study ‘investor mood’ but ‘hosting effect’. The current 
article is also similar to those of Obi et al. (2009) and Ramdas et al. (2015), as all 
investigated the hosting of mega-sport events effect’ on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE) stock market, but dissimilar in that the prior papers each examined just one major 
sport event for South Africa (2010 FIFA World Cup), while our article investigated three 
World Cup tournaments in South Africa (rugby, cricket and soccer). We see our article as an 
improvement on prior papers, as we introduced a methodological improvement to Obi et al. 
(2009) by increasing the sample size from 25 to 250, and broadened the study of Ramdas et 
al. (2015) by increasing the number of individual sport events from one to three and 
including different sports.  
 
The rest of this paper is proceeds as follows: The next section discusses the theoretical 
framework, followed by literature review of mega-sport hosting. Thereafter, the fitted 
econometric model is outlined, and then a description of the data set is provided. The report 
of empirical results is followed by a discussion to reconcile the investors’ ex ante 
expectations with the World Cup’s ex post impacts.  The paper wraps up with a conclusion 
along with a perspective on policy implications. 
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Theoretical Framework 
 
Event Study Methodology is anchored on the EMH, rational expectations hypothesis, and 
the concept of returns predictability. The economic intuition of EMH is rooted in the 
pioneering work of Fama (1970, p. 383), who since the early 1960s has preached a very 
simple sermon that an efficient market is “…a market in which prices always fully reflect 
available information”. This simple message culminated in Fama’s co-winning the 2013 
Economics Nobel Prize. For example, if an announcement to host a major international sport 
tournament generates relevant information for stock markets, then the impact of such 
information should be fully and immediately reflected in the stock prices, assuming the 
market is efficient. Available information refers to any piece of information that has the 
potential to have an impact on a company’s listed stock prices. The notion of ‘available 
information’ may include financial variables from listed companies, such as the declaration of 
a dividend, appointment of a new chief executive officer, or macroeconomic factors like 
interest rates’ movement and even industrial action. 
 
Fama (1970) categorised market efficiency into three classes: weak-form efficiency, semi-
strong form efficiency, and strong-form efficiency. A weak-form efficiency hypothesis states 
that the information on past prices and trading volume is already reflected in security prices. 
The semi-strong efficiency hypothesis says that in addition to historical information, prices 
also reflect all publicly available information. The strong-form efficiency hypothesis claims 
that in addition to the semi-strong information content, prices contain all privately available 
information. According to the EMH theory, if the market is efficient, security prices are stable 
before announcement of new relevant information. Upon release of the unanticipated 
information, prices react immediately. In theory, if the information is relevant, the prices 
should jump upwards (positive impact) or jump downwards (negative impact). In practice, the 
market may take time before the reaction, or react early, or overshoot or under-react. If the 
market is Fama-efficient, there should be no overshooting, early, delayed or under reactions. 
There should be an immediate unambiguous jump and a subsequent stable performance. 
 
Jensen (1978) has long argued that in reality, the strong-form efficiency is probably not 
achievable but it is an ideal standard for EMH. This phenomenon is better explained by the 
Grossman–Stiglitz paradox, which points to the non-existence of a competitive equilibrium. 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980, p. 393) argue that there is an equilibrium degree of 
disequilibrium. By this they mean that “prices reflect the information of informed individuals 
but only partially, so that those who expend resources to obtain information do receive 
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compensation”. The logical conclusion of this argument is that in the real world, agents are 
not equally informed, simply because the collection and interpretation of information is 
costly. Therefore markets are most likely to be efficient at weak and semi-strong forms of 
efficiency. In tandem with the Grossman–Stiglitz paradox, Fama (1991, p. 1575), reviewed 
his EMH paradigm and clarified his thoughts further: “Since there are surely positive 
information and trading costs, the extreme version of the market efficiency hypothesis is 
surely false” (italics indicate authors’ emphasis). The common findings of the literature on 
EMH empirical tests agree that markets are semi-strong efficient and not strong-form 
efficient (Bacon & Von Gersdorff, 2008; Samitas & Kenourgios, 2004). The same results 
were confirmed with studies based on the South African Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(Mlonzi, Kruger, & Nthoesane, 2011, Philpott & Firer, 1994), while supportive results were 
reported for other African stock exchanges, including Morocco (Smith & Dyakova, 2014). 
 
The theory of rational expectations, first introduced by Muth (1961), provides a basis to 
explain in part why stock market investors react to the breaking news that a country has won 
a bid to host a major international sport tournament. In order to evaluate whether the market 
will react to the release of new information, there is a need to predict what the returns will be 
in the absence of new information and to compare these with the returns performance in the 
presence of new information. It is for this reason that the question of returns predictability is 
also relevant. Event study researchers (Brown & Warner, 1980) maintain that security price 
performance may only be considered ‘abnormal’ relative to a specific benchmark. Therefore, 
it is necessary to specify a model to predict normal returns in the absence of new 
information. A model that is commonly used, also applied in this study, is Event Study 
Methodology first used by Dolley (1933) and then developed to modern framework by Fama, 
Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969). Prior to modelling the ‘normal versus abnormal’ returns, we 
first surveyed the state of research of the stock market response to the hosting of mega-
sport events. 
 
Event Studies of Major Sport Tournaments 
 
The basic objective of sport tournament event studies in relation to stock markets is to 
analyse the effects of a particular tournament on a host country’s stock market. The event 
studies of mega sports may be classified in two categories. First, studies that analyse the 
impact of change in ‘investor mood’ on stock returns as a result of a win or lose by a 
domestic sport team as noted by Edmans, Garcia, and Norli (2007), Benkraiem, Louhichi, 
and Marques (2009), Allmers and Maennig (2009), Kaplanski and Levy (2010), and Martins 
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and Serra (2011), as well as Payne, Tresl, and Friesen (2018).  Second, studies that 
investigate the effect of hosting mega-sport events on stock markets such as Dick and Wang 
(2008), Nishio et al. (2009), Sharma (2010), Liu (2011), Leeds et al. (2009), Martins and 
Serra (2011), as well as Engelhardt et al (2018). The current paper resorts in the dimension 
of the second set of studies. While the global research outcomes in this area seem to yield 
mixed results, there is a discernible pattern emerging in the research findings with respect to 
stock markets’ responses to the hosting of mega-sport events in developing countries. 
 
Stock Market Reaction to the Hosting of Mega-sport events in Developing Countries 
 
The literature reveals that the stock markets of developing countries are more likely to be 
impacted by announcements to host major sport tournaments, compared with stock markets 
in developed countries (Dick & Wang, 2008, Nishio et al., 2009). Normally, developed 
countries require less capital investment in infrastructure improvements compared with 
developing countries, simply because their existing infrastructure capacity is likely to be 
sufficient to stage such mega tournaments. In 1994, USA hosted the World Cup without a 
need to build a single additional stadium, and all existing stadiums were deemed satisfactory 
by the compliance inspectors of FIFA.  Infrastructure improvements normally include, inter 
alia, the building of stadiums, and improvements to road systems and ports of entry 
structures. 
 
Nishio et al. (2009) employed Event Study Methodology to compare the impact of the 
announcement on countries that hosted the Olympic Games between 1998 and 2004. The 
stock markets of the host countries varied from the developed economies of the USA, 
Japan, and France, to the developing economies of South Korea and Greece. Their results 
showed a positive impact on the stock markets in the lesser developed Greece and South 
Korea. In contrast, the more developed Japan and France experienced little to zero impact. 
Further, the authors found that Greece was negatively impacted when it lost its bid to host 
the 1996 Olympic Games, while the USA stock market responded positively to a loss. 
However, the stock markets in France, China and Italy were not impacted when those 
countries lost their bids to Spain, Australia and Greece in 1992, 2000 and 2004 respectively. 
Similarly, no stock market impact was observed for the Olympic Games hosted in 1992 and 
2000 by Spain and Australia respectively. 
 
Sharma (2010) used Event Study Methodology to analyse stock market reactions to hosting 
of mega-sport events in four developing countries of Asia namely, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, 
and Bangladesh, following the hosting announcement of the 2011 Cricket World Cup 
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matches. Their results showed a positive reaction by all stock markets. These results convey 
a persuasive case that stock markets in developing countries are more likely to respond 
positively to the hosting of mega-sport events owing to the perceived infrastructure 
improvement opportunities in local economies. If this explanation is accepted, what is the 
meaning of cases where stock markets respond negatively to the hosting of mega-sport 
events, including developing countries? 
 
Stock Markets React Negatively to Inefficient hosting of mega-sport events 
 
The stock market in China was impacted negatively when China won the bid to host the 
2008 Olympic Games (Leeds et al., 2009, Liu, 2011). Stock market investors in China 
perceived the economic activities associated with hosting the 2008 Olympic Games not to be 
optimally used, hence the negative reaction. The market view seems to be that resources 
should have been expended on other economic activities, rather than overspending on event 
preparation such as was the case in China. Leeds et al. (2009) reported that China spent 
$40 billion as part of upfront tournament preparations for the 2008 Olympic Games, which is 
$12 billion more than what Greece spent in the 2004 Olympic Games, and $1.7 billion more 
than what Australia spent on their hosting of the 2000 Olympic Games.  
 
In view of the above, it is evident that the empirical research findings regarding the hosting of 
mega-sport events are mixed, but appear to lean more towards positive stock market 
reaction. Martins and Serra (2011) used Event Study Methodology to analyse 81 
announcements (a rare large sample size) to host Olympic Games, FIFA World Cups, and 
European Football Cups between 1955 and 2003. Their aggregated conclusions were that, 
on average, the announcements had a positive price reaction. 
 
Methodology 
 
The Study Hypotheses 
The research question sought to establish whether an announcement to host a major 
international sport event would cause domestic stock prices to react positively, negatively or 
to not respond. 
 
Hypothesis Test 1: How does the stock market respond to the bid-winner for hosting the 
sport event? We tested the null hypothesis (H0) that the announcement of the decision to 
host each of the three world cup events, the 1995 Rugby World Cup, 2003 Cricket World 
Cup, and 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa had zero price reaction from the South 
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African stock market against the alternative (HA) that there was a price reaction. If H0 is 
rejected, we conclude that there is significant statistical evidence to support the finding that 
the announcement of the decision to host the relevant tournament in South Africa is 
associated with stock price reaction.  
 
Hypothesis Test 2: How does the domestic stock market respond to the news of bid-loser for 
hosting a sport event? We tested the null hypothesis (H0) that the announcement of losing a 
bid to host the sport event had zero stock-price reaction against the alternative (HA) that 
there was a price reaction. If H0 is rejected, we conclude that there is significant statistical 
evidence to support the finding that the announcement of losing a bid to host a sport event 
has some effect on the stock market. This test was applied to the Moroccan stock market, 
since Morocco lost the bid to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup to South Africa.  
 
Other tournaments (1995 Rugby World Cup, and 2003 Cricket World Cup) did not have bid 
losers owing to the negotiated bidding process at the time. The 1995 Rugby World Cup was 
awarded to South Africa after all international sanctions were removed in the early 1990s. 
Regarding cricket, South Africa initially bid for the 1996 Cricket World Cup. However, a deal 
was reached whereby all the other bidders would have a chance to host a Cricket World Cup 
in succession. Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan hosted the 1996 World Cup first, followed by 
England who hosted the1999 World Cup. South Africa hosted the 2003 World Cup. 
 
Econometric Model 1: Event Study Methodology 
The Event Study Methodology used in the current study has wide applications in financial 
economics and other fields, including mergers and acquisitions (Hayward, 2002); earning 
announcements (MacKinlay, 1997); corporate reorganisation (Lee, 2001); investment 
decisions (Kun, Dow, & Grover, 2001), as well as political events (Cheng, Kang, & Tzeng, 
2011), among others. Historically the application of Event Study Methodology may be traced 
to the 1930s, where initially empirical investigation was mainly the price effects of stock 
splits. The level of econometric sophistication has since increased in the methodology of 
event studies. Kothari and Warner (2006) noted more than 565 event studies between 1974 
and 2000 published in five leading financial economics journals. Corrado (2011) observed 
that this survey by Kothari and Warner (2006) was conservative, as it excluded many event 
studies published in accounting and other financial journals. Among recent researchers that 
reviewed Event Study Methodology, MacKinlay (1997) has extensively validated optimal 
model specifications, and his valued recommendations are followed in the present article. 
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The basic analytical objective of Event Study Methodology is to compare the expected stock 
performance (called normal performance), and unexpected stock performance (called 
abnormal performance), which is introduced by the release of new information. The 
econometric model was estimated and tested using Equations 1.1 to 1.5. The abnormal 
returns equation is defined as follows: 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑡−1]                         (1.1) 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, σ𝑖
2) 
 
The abnormal returns (𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) are assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) 
normal, and represent the unexpected error of the expected return model. Thus, the 
abnormal return is assumed to have a mean of zero and a constant variance. It is estimated 
as the difference between actual returns (𝑅𝑖𝑡) of market index 𝑖 at event day t and the 
expected returns 𝐸[𝑅𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑡−1] conditional on X𝑡−1, the information set for the normal 
performance model. Actual returns are computed in Equation 1.2: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑖𝑡) − 𝑙𝑛(Pit−1)                               (1.2) 
 
The variables, 𝑃𝑖𝑡 and Pit-1 represent daily current and lagged stock market index, 
respectively. 
 
MacKinlay (1997) recommends two sets of econometric specifications for computing normal 
performance: statistical models (Constant Mean Return (CMR) Model, or Market Model) and 
economic models such as, Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by Lintner (1965) and 
Sharpe (1964), or Asset Pricing Theory (APT) by Ross (1977). The statistical models follow 
from statistical assumptions of asset returns and do not depend on any economic 
arguments. The models assume that asset returns are jointly multivariate normal, and 
independently and identically distributed through time. The economic models do not only rely 
on statistical assumptions but are also conditioned on assumptions concerning the investor’s 
behaviour. 
 
In the current study, we chose the CMR model on the strong recommendation that it delivers 
results on par with more sophisticated models such as CAPM or multi-factor models (Brown 
& Warner, 1980, 1985; MacKinlay, 1997). In agreement with this status quo, Campbell, Lo 
and MacKinlay (1996, p.154) say that: “This lack of sensitivity to the model choice can be 
attributed to the fact that the variance of the abnormal return is frequently not reduced much 
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by choosing a more sophisticated model.”  The CMR was used in other event studies for 
example, Ryan and Taffler (2004), as well as Stankeviþienơ and Akelaitisb (2014). 
Therefore, in keeping with the desirable principle of parsimony in model design, our 
preferred benchmark framework was the constant mean of the market model. Abnormal 
returns are aggregated in order to draw overall inferences from the event. In this study, we 
applied the time-series aggregation as per Equation 1.3: 
CARi(T1, T2) =  ∑ ARit
T2
t=T1
                        (1.3) 
 
CARi represents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns of market index i , from T1 to T2. The 
abnormal performance period is used to measure the effects of the event within the event 
window. The last step in Event Study Methodology is to test the null hypothesis that CAR are 
zero (a two-sided test). The main empirical investigation in this study was to test whether the 
stock price reacted to the announcement of the decision to host the individual major 
international sport tournaments in both South Africa and Morocco. We used the standard 
parametric test statistic in Equation 1.4, while Equation 1.5 defines the variance of CAR 
within the event window as: 
 
𝛳1 =  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇1,𝑇2)
√𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇1,𝑇2))
  ~ 𝑁(0,1) ,                 (1.4) 
where 
Var(CARi(T1, T2)) = 𝜎𝑒𝑖
2 =  
1
𝐿1
∑ (𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡)
2𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
        (1.5) 
 
Econometric issues in Event Study Methodology 
Given that Event Study Methodology is widely used to study the impact of price-sensitive 
events in financial markets, it is critical to ensure compliance with technical specifications 
and validated applications. Brown and Warner (1980), McWilliams and Siegel (1997), as well 
as MacKinlay (1997) argue that the methodology depends on a set of assumptions that if not 
implemented correctly will lead to biased and imprecise empirical results. In this section, the 
design issues of Event Study Methodology are outlined. 
 
Confounding effects: The methodology was based on the assumption that there were no 
confounding effects on the announcement date. Confounding effects refer to other factors 
unrelated to the event or fundamentals that may also induce a stock price reaction. There is 
always a strong possibility of unrelated concurrent events, and if not taken into account, will 
distort inferences from the results. Owing to the nature of our study, our concern is events 
that have the potential to impact the entire stock market (sources of systematic risk). 
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Examples of such events are economic growth; changes in regulations, fiscal or monetary 
policies; political issues; and industrial and environmental issues. In this article we minimised 
the problem by choosing a short event window, so that possible confounding effects could 
be identified and excluded. Following this approach, and systematically screening the event 
window, no confounding events were identified. 
 
Identification of event date: It is important to identify the exact date when the market 
received the new information. Uncertainty of event date would make it difficult to specify 
correctly the period within which to analyse the impact of the event. In this article, the events 
of interest took place through scheduled public announcements by the respective sports 
administration bodies, the International Rugby Body (IRB), International Cricket Council 
(ICC), and FIFA. Consequently, there was no problem of event date uncertainty. 
 
Time series frequency of security returns: The security returns are available at different 
sampling intervals, which could range from high frequency (monthly, quarterly, or annually) 
to low frequency (hourly, daily, weekly) data. Longer sampling intervals suffer from a lack of 
power compared with shorter intervals. MacKinlay (1997, p.34) states that, “there is a 
substantial payoff in terms of increased power from reducing the sampling interval”. Shorter 
sampling intervals, namely, daily returns, were chosen in the current study to benefit from 
the increased power. 
 
Sample size: The sample size has implications on data distribution. The test statistic used in 
Event Study Methodology is based on the normality assumption associated with large 
samples. In this study, the estimation window was large enough and comprised 250 
observations (approximately one trading year of returns). This is within the safe, and 
validated sample range (Brown & Warner, 1985). 
 
Size of event window: Long event windows reduce the power of the test statistics. This 
reduction leads to false inferences from the significance of an event. A short event window is 
more likely to capture the significant effect of the event. To address this problem, the event 
window should be as short as possible, but long enough to capture leaks. In this study a 
window of (-20; +20). 
 
Irregular time series intervals: Sometimes prices may be presented as having been recorded 
at the interval of one length, when in fact they have been recorded at the interval of other 
irregular lengths. For example, the daily prices of securities are ‘closing’ prices, prices at 
which the last transaction in all securities occurred. The issue is that the last transaction 
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does not occur at the same time for all securities, and some securities may not have traded 
on that day. This problem normally is critical when dealing with multiple firms, but not when 
dealing with indices, as is the case of the current study. 
 
Even though we believe we addressed the typical econometrics issues associated with 
event studies, we further used an alternative model to allow for comparison of results. We 
chose a suitable model among a family of the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) models. 
 
Econometric Model 2: EGARCH 
Event Study Methodology (used in Model 1) is commonly applied and widely accepted as a 
workhorse for testing market responses to price-sensitive events. A recent review is 
‘Econometrics of Event Studies’ by Kothari and Warner (2006). Nevertheless, some have 
expressed dissatisfaction with the Event Study Methodology’s assumptions that the error 
terms of financial securities are uncorrelated (for example, Lo and MacKinlay, 1988; Wang, 
Salin, Hooker, & Leatham, 2002). This concern is raised because the idea of uncorrelated 
error terms in event studies is in conflict with the well-known stylised facts of security returns 
in finance (Cont, 2001), such as volatility clustering, fat-tailness, and asymmetries. 
 
Although the presence of stylised facts of security returns is most probable, they remain an 
empirical matter, and an important one. Our study takes such model implications into 
consideration, and like Wang et al. (2002) we used a model that adjusted for GARCH, 
pioneered by Bollerslev (1986). GARCH relaxes the assumption of homoscedasticity in that 
it allows conditional variance to change as past residuals and variances change. 
 
In this study we applied an extension of GARCH, the Exponential GARCH (EGARCH) 
proposed by Nelson (1991). The advantages of EGARCH include its built-in capacity to 
satisfy the non-negativity condition of variance, and its primary value of relaxing the 
constraint of volatility symmetry imposed by the basic GARCH. Researchers such as Corhay 
and Rad (1994) and Chu, Lin, as well as Prather (2005) support the use of GARCH-type 
models in event studies. In view of this and for the purpose of prudence and robustness, we 
supplemented Event Study Methodology with the EGARCH model. 
 
To summarise, our objective was to test the stock market reaction to the hosting of mega-
sport events, while taking advantage of EGARCH’s capacity to control for variance changes, 
volatility asymmetry, and leverage effects. The model is estimated through a combination of 
the mean equations in Equation 2.1, and the variance equation in Equation 2.2: 
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𝑦𝑡 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜑2𝑦𝑡−2 + 𝜑3𝑥𝑡 + 𝛿𝑤𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 ,   ∀ 𝑡 = 1, 2, 3 … 𝑁       2.1 
 
𝜀𝑡 ~ 𝑁(0, ℎ𝑡 ) 
 
log (ℎ𝑡) = 𝜔 +  𝛼 |
𝜀𝑡−1
√ℎ𝑡−1
| + 𝜆
𝜀𝑡−1
√ℎ𝑡−1
+ 𝛽log(ℎ𝑡−1) +  𝜙𝑤𝑡                2.2 
 
We estimated two univariate EGARCH (1, 1) models for each of the two market indices: the 
All Share Index (ALSI) of the JSE, and the Moroccan All Share Index (MASI) of the 
Casablanca Stock Exchange (CSE). The choice of lag was based on model performance 
and parsimony as recommended by model evaluation literature (Hansen & Lunde, 2005). In 
Equation 2.1, 𝑦𝑡 is the daily compounded stock index return at time t. The data-generating 
process for the mean equation is autoregressive model, AR(p). The lag order of p was 
determined through the usual econometric procedures (Ljung–Box statistical text, and 
Schwarz Information Criterion). Similar to Kanas (1998), we found AR(2) to be optimal. The 
covariate, 𝑥𝑡 is a control variable in the form of a dummy for the bank crisis that occurred 
from 2007 to 2010. The variable, 𝑤𝑡 is a dummy for the event window. We tested three 
intervals of (-5, +5): (-10,+10), and (-20, +20) around the event day of ‘0’, and this is an 
explanatory variable of interest for this study. Therefore, in Equation 2.1, 𝛿 is a parameter of 
primary focus. 
 
In Equation 2.2, 𝜀𝑡−1and ℎ𝑡−1 are the one-period ARCH and GARCH, respectively. The 𝜔, 𝛼, 
𝜆, 𝛽, and 𝜙 are model coefficients to be estimated. The parameters, 𝛼, and 𝜆 are the 
volatility size (or symmetry) and sign (or leverage) effects of the EGARCH model, 
respectively. When 𝜆 < 0, this means that negative disturbances (bad news) increase 
volatility more than positive shocks (good news). If 𝜆 > 0, then positive shocks have more 
impact on conditional variance than negative shocks. For the case of 𝜆 = 0, the third term in 
Equation 2.2 disappears and there is no asymmetry or leverage effects in the data-
generating process of conditional variance. The parameter, 𝛽 measures persistence in 
conditional variance. The more 𝛽 approaches the value one, then the more persistence is 
manifested in the system. This means that a shock can take a very long time before it 
subsides. To reiterate, the goal of this modelling was to test whether the hosting of a mega 
sport had an impact on stock market returns. In this regard, if the coefficients 𝛿, and 𝜙 are 
significant (either one of them or both), then there is an effect. 
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Data Characteristics 
 
Witt (1988) categorised a tournament as a major international sport tournament dependent 
on the large number of international visitors it attracts, revenue generated, and most 
importantly, its worldwide reputation. This study excluded small tournaments hosted in South 
Africa simply because they did not meet the criteria for a major international sport 
tournament as defined by Witt (1988). The study used log returns computed from 
established stock price indices: ALSI (JSE) and MASI (CSE). The historical prices were 
obtained from Bloomberg market data. 
 
Regarding Event Study model, we first discarded the last 20 data points prior to the event 
day to avoid possible confounding events. Then we considered 291 observations of daily log 
returns to be analysed into two time periods. The estimation of normal performance was 
conducted on a sample size of 250 within the estimation window of (-291, -20). The 
estimation of abnormal performance was tested within the event window of (-20, +20) with 
41 observations. The event was assigned a time period of ‘0’, the day of event 
announcement. If an announcement date fell on a non-trading day (weekend or public 
holiday), the next trading day was taken as the event date. Owing to national interest, the 
announcements of bid-winners of host countries in mega sports are publicly available and 
easily cross-validated from the relevant sport governing bodies, as summarised in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
There is an important observation on the data design for estimating the two models, the 
Event Study, and EGARCH. For the Event Study Methodology, the time series was arranged 
on the event timeline, while for EGARCH the time series was arranged on normal daily 
calendar time. The EGARCH data sample is for the period, 6 May 2003 to 27 May 2012, 
which amounts to 2227 observations.  The information regarding the event announcement 
dates was confirmed with sources from the respective event organisers, the South African 
Rugby Union (SARU), FIFA and the ICC. 
 
Empirical Results 
 
Results of Event Study Model. 
The results answer an empirical question of whether there was a stock price reaction to the 
announcement of hosting mega-sport tournaments, the 1995 Rugby World Cup, 2003 
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Cricket World Cup, South Africa’s winning the 2010 FIFA World Cup bid, and Morocco’s 
losing the bid. A parametric t-test was performed on CARs within the event window of (-20, 
+20) days. Table 2 presents the results. The stock market reacted positively to all the 
hosting bid wins (1995 Rugby World Cup, 2003 Cricket World Cup, and South Africa’s 
winning the 2010 FIFA World Cup), and responded negatively to the hosting bid loss 
(Morocco). 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
By way of interpretation, the results in Table 2 show that over a period of 41 days around the 
announcement day, the CARs increased to 4.2%, 4.7%, and 10.5% for the 1995 Rugby 
World Cup, 2003 Cricket World Cup, and 2010 FIFA World Cup, respectively. The CAR plots 
allowed us to observe the movement of returns for the periods leading to the announcement, 
during the announcement, and after the announcement. The graphical presentation below 
allows us to further see if investors reacted before the announcement, immediately on the 
announcement day, or after the announcement. The early reactions might be due to 
investors expecting a good or bad announcement, while the delayed reactions might be due 
to investors not hearing the news immediately. The accumulation also allows us to make 
overall inferences from the impact of the announcement. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 1 captures the manifestation of market reaction to the bid announcement of winning 
or losing the opportunity to host mega-sport events: the 1995 Rugby World Cup, 2003 
Cricket World Cup, South Africa’s winning the 2010 FIFA World Cup bid, and Morocco’s 
losing the bid to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup.  
 
The JSE reacted positively to South Africa’s securing the opportunity to host the 1995 Rugby 
World Cup. The returns decreased from day -20 to day -4 and made a sudden positive jump; 
then drifted upwards gradually in the post-event date period. There was a sudden jump of 
21% three days before the announcement from -4.88% to -3.83% of CARs. This reaction is 
statistically significant at less than 1%. The price reaction before the announcement could 
mean the market predicted a positive announcement, especially as the 1995 Rugby World 
Cup was awarded to South Africa without the country submitting any bid. The JSE reacted 
positively to the opportunity to host the 2003 Cricket World Cup. Figure 1 shows an upward 
drift from day -20 to day -1 in the period before the announcement. This upward drift could 
imply that the market expected South Africa to win the bid, which was subsequently settled 
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by mutual arrangement. The plot also reflects a big jump up to six days after the 
announcement and a decline in the post-event period. This movement could be interpreted 
as the market having absorbed the news and settled back to normal performance range. The 
JSE reacted positively to South Africa’s winning a competitive bid to host the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup. Figure 1 shows an upward and gradual drift from day -20 to day -2, with an 
immediate jump of 28% at day -1, one trading day before the announcement day. CARs 
increased from 9.67% to 12.45%. This reaction is statistically significant at less than 1% 
level. The returns declined in the post-event date period, showing that the market was 
beginning to settle back to its usual performance levels. The CSE reacted negatively to the 
news of Morocco’s losing the opportunity to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup. The abnormal 
cumulative returns fell by 4.2% over a 41-day period around the announcement day, with a 
statistical significance of 1%. Figure 1 shows that CARs declined prior to the event date; 
thereafter there was an immediate big decline on the first trading day after the 
announcement day. The magnitude of the decline in CARs was significant, around 114% 
from -3.01% to -6.43%. The market tried to revert to a new stable performance in the post-
event period. 
 
On aggregate, the results in relation to the JSE reaction to an opportunity (by South Africa) 
to host a mega-sport event (in rugby, cricket, or soccer) are unambiguously positive and 
statistically significant at less than 1%. In contrast, the CSE responded negatively to the 
news of losing a competitive bid to host the FIFA World Cup. The results of this study are 
largely consistent with the existing literature from other countries on the impact of hosting 
major international sport tournaments, such as Dawson et al. (2004), Martins and Serra 
(2011), Nishio et al. (2009), and Sharma (2010). 
 
Our findings appear to report a more decisive case of positive stock market reaction to the 
hosting of mega-sport events compared with a related South African study by Obi et al. 
(2009), who investigated the impact of the 2010 FIFA World Cup on the South African stock 
market. Their results were somewhat inconclusive. They found negative (significant) CARs 
prior to the announcement date, positive (insignificant) CARs during the event month, and 
positive (significant) CARs in the post-event period. This concludes the interpretation of 
results from Model 1, the Event Study Methodology. We now report the test results for the 
same research question but under a different method (Model 2) in which we relax the Event 
Study model’s assumption of homoscedasticity of error terms. 
 
Results of EGARCH Model  
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Table 4 reports the estimation output of Model 2, EGARCH. Column B presents results for 
the South African (JSE) stock market, while column C provides results for the Moroccan 
(CSE) stock market. Column A has a list of common covariates for both JSE and CSE 
EGARCH models. We used the EGARCH model to test the stock market response in the 
event windows defined as (-5,+5): (-10, +10), and (-20,+20). Each window is assigned an 
indicator of 1, and zero otherwie. Each window was tested both under the mean equation 
(2.1) and variance equation (2.2). We tested one window at a time. This meant that we ran 
exactly the same EGARCH specification three times. The results of this replication process 
are reported in Table 4. First, for South Africa’s JSE, the event window coefficients for all 
windows, (-5, +5); (-10, 10); and (-20, +20) are positive under the mean equation (2.1), 
meaning an increase in returns, and insignificant under the variance equation. All are 
significant at less than one or five percent levels. Second, for Morocco’s CSE, the 
coefficients for all event windows (-5, +5), (-10, +10), and (-20, +20) are negative for both 
mean equation (2.1), and variance equation (2.2), meaning a reduction in returns and 
volatility, respectively. All except the coefficient for window (-10, +10) are statistically 
significant. 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
There is a logical and consistent pattern that emerges from the results that the stock market 
reacted positively to the news of winning an event-hosting opportunity (South Africa), and 
that this positive reaction manifested in an increase in returns, while volatility dynamics were 
unaffected. The second pattern is that the stock market reacted negatively to the news of 
losing the opportunity to host a mega-sport event, and that this negative response appears 
in both returns and volatility reduction. Overall, the results of EGARCH (Model 2) are 
consistent with Event Study Methodology (Model 1) in that a positive effect is observed for 
the JSE in both models, and a negative effect is reported for the CSE in both models. Other 
variables in the model: the sign effect reports that bad news has greater impact than positive 
news (𝜆 < 0) for the JSE, while in the CSE, the positive shocks (𝜆 > 0) add more volatility 
than negative shocks. In both the JSE and CSE, conditional variances experience high 
persistence in that the coefficient, 𝛽, is close to 1. 
 
In general, the empirical tests presented in this study show a price reaction associated with 
all the announcements. The study concludes that the economic activities associated with 
hosting major international sport tournaments in South Africa are deemed beneficial as 
viewed by the domestic stock market. Our results confirm the study of Mirman and Sharma 
(2010), who found significant impacts on the stock markets of bid-losers. 
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Investors’ ex ante Expectations and the World Cup ex post Outcomes 
Sport has the power to change the world. It has the power to inspire. It has the power 
to unite people in a way that little else does. It speaks to youth in a language they 
understand. Sport can create hope, where once there was only despair (Nelson 
Mandela’s speech at the Laureus World Sports Awards, Monte Carlo, Monaco, 25 
May 2000). 
 
Arguably, after South Africa’s 1994 national elections which heralded the correction of past 
racial politics coupled with a sincere desire for progress towards social cohesion, the country 
stood to benefit from, inter alia, the claimed (see Mandela’s words above) unifying clout of 
massive international sport events. This was evident in the country’s persistence in hosting 
the 1995 Rugby World Cup, 2003 Cricket World Cup, followed by the 2010 FIFA World Cup, 
among others. Nevertheless, similar to other countries, bidding for a mega-sport event like 
the FIFA World Cup, these endeavours raised certain economic expectations which would 
have been discounted by the financial markets in accordance with Fama’s (1965, 1970, 
1991) EMH. The empirical results of positive investor reaction to the news of World Cup 
hosting were reported in the earlier parts of this article. This section re-visits this investor 
response, to interrogate the rationale for these results. In particular, we assess whether the 
South African stock market’s perceived country benefits from hosting the FIFA World Cup 
were realised. In this regard, certain economic sectors and activities were touted as key 
beneficiaries, including construction, telecommunications, transportation, tourism, foreign 
investment, employment, tax revenues, and general economic growth. In view of this, 
questions of interest include: First, how does the JSE stock market’s ex post response 
compare with the stock markets of other World Cup host countries? Second, do the ex post 
economic fundamentals of World Cup hosting support the observed stock market reactions?  
 
FIGURE 2 - ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 2 shows how the domestic stock markets of countries that hosted the World Cup in 
the period 1990–2014 performed one month and 12 months after the tournament 
(Gunnarsson, 2018). It emerges that one month after the tournament, the South African 
stock market outperformed the Morgan Stanley Capital International World Index (MSCI) by 
2.3% (compared with the average of 1.7% for other host countries), and sustained the 
improved performance at 4.1% in the 12 months after the FIFA World Cup. These numbers 
are a useful descriptive interpretation of ex post stock market performance, and they paint a 
consistent picture with the main econometric analysis in this article. 
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In order to calculate the ex ante economic assessment, the international consultancy firm, 
Grant Thornton, was contracted by the South African government. Initially (in 2003) they 
estimated the 2010 FIFA World Cup would have a general economic impact of ZAR25 billion 
and additional ZAR8.46 billion tax revenues, and they later (in 2008) expanded their 
predictions to ZAR60 billion of economic impact, ZAR21 billion of increased tax revenues, 
381 000 additional jobs, and 480 000 incoming tourist visits (Allmers & Maenning, 2009). In 
tandem with experience in other host countries, these numbers were subsequently adjusted 
down, by and large, after the tournament. 
 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
According to the South African government’s final ex post report of the 2010 World Cup, a 
total of ZAR30.57 billion (South Africa, 2011) was ploughed into the entire tournament. 
Figure 3 shows how expenditure was distributed through different sectors. The report further 
states a total socio-economic impact (direct and indirect) of ZAR7.95 billion (South Africa, 
2011), in the eight host cities (Johannesburg, Pretoria, Rustenburg, Polokwane, 
Bloemfontein, Durban, Cape Town, and Port Elizabeth). According to government figures, 
the number of foreign visitors to the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa was 309 554 
(South Africa, 2011), which generated a revenue of ZAR3.64 billion. Further, the report say 
that 130 000 jobs were created in construction, transport, and hospitality, leading to a total 
income of ZAR2 billion (South Africa, 2011), with a direct impact on poor households. 
 
In order to assess whether the market expectations were misaligned with actual economic 
outcomes, it is important to consider global benchmarks. Some analysts specialising in 
computable general equilibrium modelling (Bohlmann & Van Heerden, 2008; Brunet, 2005; 
Madden, 2002; Sterken, 2006) found positive results in the impact evaluation of mega-sport 
events. Nevertheless, many studies, including those of Crompton (1995), Porter (1999), 
Szymanski (2002), Baade and Matheson (2004a, 2004b), Feddersen, Maennig, and 
Borcherding (2006), Feddersen, Grötzinger, and Maennig (2009), Maennig and Du Plessis 
(2007), Matheson (2009), Allmers and Maennig (2009), Preuss (2011), and Feddersen and 
Maennig (2012, 2013) cautioned that the often claimed high economic benefits linked to the 
hosting of mega-sport events are, by and large, small to modest, if present at all. In view of 
the above, and in comparing the ex ante and ex post information, it is clear that the 2010 
World Cup was a success, and that the country did benefit from this hosting, but less than 
pre-event predictions. Indeed, some economists always held the view that “…given proper 
long-term planning and vision, FIFA 2010 could turn out to be the most profitable investment 
in this country's [South Africa] history” (Bohlmann & Van Heerden, 2008, p. 11). 
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Researchers in political science posit that the World Cup has the potential to benefit the 
African continent by reducing the historical Afro-pessimism, that is, hard to shake-off 
perceptions of underdevelopment, poverty, mismanagement and incapacity (Anholt, 2007; 
Lepp & Gibson, 2011). This negative image has the potential to limit business opportunities, 
including foreign investment. Dowse (2011, p. 12) observed that, “South Africa had been 
empowered by the event and gained significant social capital in the region [of Africa].” 
 
By way of reconciling stock market expectations, ex post performance, and the World Cup 
economic fundamentals, a few observations may be noted. First, the organisation of the 
World Cup was a success in that logistics and preparations complied with FIFA requirements 
within the stipulated deadlines. Second, according to FIFA (2011b, p. 1), the global 
“television coverage of the competition reached over 3.2 billion people around the world”, 
and “this represents an eight percent rise in the number of viewers recorded during the 2006 
FIFA World Cup Germany”.  All these positive indicators are important for South Africa’s 
reputation as first-time African host. Third, after considering the possible imperfections in 
quantifying the event’s economic impacts (HSRC, 2011; South Africa, 2011), our observation 
is that the stock market has assessed the practical net present value of the World Cup after 
all relevant knock-on effects have dwindled, and has found these to be positive, though 
arguably moderate. Figure 3 shows that the portion of expenditure with high-opportunity cost 
(stadiums) constitutes only thirty percent of the total cost. The most important and necessary 
developments that probably would not have occurred (at all, faster, or of the same standard), 
include the comprehensively developed airports, road infrastructures, new bus service (Reya 
Vaya, a bus rapid transit system with designated traffic lanes), new high-speed partial 
underground train (the Gautrain), innovations in telecommunications, as well as other value-
add services like safety and disaster management systems. The FIFA President 
summarised his post-tournament report as follows: “The 2010 FIFA World Cup in South 
Africa was not just successful from a sporting point of view ... it also underlined the immense 
social and cultural power of our game” (FIFA, 2011a, p. 7). 
 
Conclusion 
 
The study applied an Event Study Methodology and EGARCH model to investigate the stock 
market’s reaction to the news of a home country’s winning an opportunity to host a mega- 
sport event. The study was based on the 1995 Rugby World Cup, 2003 Cricket World Cup, 
and 2010 FIFA World Cup. In respect of the latter, we tested both the bid winner (South 
Africa) and the bid loser (Morocco). In the Event Study Methodology, the normal 
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performance was evaluated within the estimation period of (-291, -20), while the abnormal 
performance was tested within the event window of (-20, 20), using a parametric test. The 
EGARCH model was used to re-test the stock market response to the news of winning (by 
South Africa), and losing (by Morocco) the bid to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup. The test 
was replicated in three event windows (-5,5), (-10,10) and (-20,20). In both the Event Study 
Methodology and EGARCH model, our findings show a consistent positive stock market 
reaction to the home country’s winning the opportunity to host a mega-sport event, and a 
negative stock market reaction to losing a bid to host a mega-sport tournament. 
 
The results accord with related empirical studies indicating a positive correlation between 
hosting of mega-sport events and stock market reaction in developing countries owing to the 
necessary prioritised and massive infrastructural development that would otherwise not 
materialise. The findings of this study should benefit stock market investors, financial market, 
policy makers, and the sport industry. 
 
References 
Allmers, S. & Maennig, W. (2009). Economic impacts of the FIFA World Cups in France 1998, 
Germany 2006, and outlook for South Africa 2010. Eastern Economic Journal, 35(4), 500–
519. 
Anholt, S. (2007). Brand Africa: What is competitive identity? African Analyst, 2(2), 72–81. 
Antón, A., Alonso, J. & Rodríguez, G. (2011). Mega-events impact on economic growth: Analysis 
of the South African World Cup. African Journal of Business Management, 5(16), 6940–6948. 
Baade, R.A. & Matheson, V. (2004a). The quest for the Cup: Assessing the economic impact of 
the World Cup. Regional Studies, 38(4), 343–354. 
Baade, R.A. & Matheson, V. (2004b). Mega-sporting events in developing nations: Playing the 
way to prosperity? South African Journal of Economics, 72(5), 1084–1095. 
Baade, R.A., Baumann, R.W. & Matheson, V. A. (2008). Assessing the economic impact of 
college football games on local economies. Journal of Sports Economics, 9(6), 628–643. 
Bacon, F. & Von Gersdorff, N. (2008). U.S. mergers & acquisitions: A test of market efficiency. 
Journal of Finance & Accountancy, 13(1), 69–70. 
Benkraiem, R., Louhichi, W. & Marques, P. (2009). Market reaction to sporting results: The case 
of European listed football clubs. Management Decision, 47(1), 100–109. 
Berman, G., Brooks, R. & Davidson, S. (2000). The Sydney Olympic Games announcement and 
Australian stock market reaction. Applied Economics Letters, 7(12), 781–784. 
Bohlmann, H.R. & Van Heerden, J.H. (2008). Predicting the economic impact of the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup on South Africa. International Journal of Sport Management and Marketing, 3(4), 
383–396. 
Bollerslev, T. (1986). Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. Journal of 
Econometrics, 3(6), 307–327. 
Brown, S.J. & Warner, J.B. (1980). Measuring security price performance. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 8(3), 205–258. 
Brown, S.J. & Warner, J.B. (1985). Using daily stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 
14(1), 3–31. 
Brunet, F. (2005) The economic impact of the Barcelona Olympic Games, 1986–2004: 
Barcelona: The legacy of the Games, 1992–2002. Working Paper No. WP084. Barcelona: 
Centre d’Estudis Olímpics, Faculty of Economics and Business Science, Universitat 
Autònoma de Barcelona. 
 
23 
Campbell, J.Y., Lo, A.W. & MacKinlay, A.C. (1996). The Econometrics of Financial Markets. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Cheng, M., Kang, W. & Tzeng, Z. (2011). The impact on non-macroeconomic events on Taiwan 
electronic industry stock index returns. Global Economy and Finance Journal, 4(1), 80–101. 
Chu, T.H., Lin, C.C. & Prather, L.J. (2005). Extension of security price reactions around product 
recall announcements. Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 44(3), 33–48. 
Cont, R. (2001). Empirical properties of asset returns: Stylized facts and statistical issues. 
Quantitative Finance, 1, 223–236. 
Corhay, A. & Rad, A.T. (1994). Statistical properties of daily returns: Evidence from European 
stock markets. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 21(2), 271–282. 
Cornelissen, S. (2004). 'It's Africa's turn!' The narratives and legitimations surrounding the 
Moroccan and South African bids for the 2006 and 2010 FIFA Finals. Third World Quarterly, 
25(7), 1293–1309. 
Corrado, C.J. (2011). Event studies: A methodology review. Accounting and Finance Journal, 
51(1), 207–234. 
Crompton, J. (1995). Economic impact analysis of sports facilities and events: Eleven sources of 
misapplication. Journal of Sport Management, 9(1), 14–35. 
Dawson, P., Kasimati, E. & Veraros, N. (2004). The 2004 Olympic Games announcement and its 
effect on the Athens and Milan stock exchanges. Applied Economics Letters, 11(12), 749–
753. 
Demir, E. & Rigoni, U. (2017). You lose, I feel better: rivalry between soccer teams and the 
impact of Schadenfreude on stock market. Journal of Sports Economics, 18(1), 58–76. 
Dick, C.D. & Wang, Q. (2008). The economic impact of Olympic Games: Evidence from stock 
markets. Centre for European Economic Research. Discussion Paper No. 08-060. Manheim: 
Centre for European Economic Research. 
Dollesa, H. & Söderman, S. (2008). Mega-sporting events in Asia – Impacts on society, business 
and management: An introduction. Asian Business and Management, 7(2), 47–162.  
Dolley, J.C. (1933). Characteristics and Procedure of Common Stock Split-Ups. Harvard 
Business Review, 11: 316–26. 
Dowse, S. (2011). Power play: International politics, Germany, South Africa and the FIFA World 
Cup. Occasional Paper, No. 82, May. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Foreign Affairs.  
Edmans, A., Garcia, D. & Norli, O. (2007). Sport sentiment and stock returns. The Journal of 
Finance, 62(4), 1967–1998. 
Engelhardt, B., Matheson, V., Yen, A. & Chisolm, M. (2018). The economic impact of Olympic 
Games: effects of host country announcements on stock market returns. International Journal 
of Sport Finance, 13(3), 243-261. 
Fama, E.F. (1965). The behavior of stock-market prices. Journal of Business, 38(1), 34–105. 
Fama, E.F., Fisher, L., Jensen, M.C. & Roll, R. (1969). The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New 
Information. International Economic Review, 10(1): 1-21. 
Fama, E.F. (1970). Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work. The Journal 
of Finance, 25(2), 383–417. 
Fama, E.F. (1991). Efficient capital markets II. The Journal of Finance, 46(5), 1575–1617. 
Feddersen, A. & Maennig, W. (2012). Sectoral labour market effects of the 2006 FIFA World 
Cup. Labour Economics, 19(6), 860–869.  
Feddersen, A. & Maennig, W. (2013). Mega-events and sectoral employment: The case of the 
1996 Olympic Games. Contemporary Economic Policy, 30(3), 580–603. 
Feddersen, A., Grötzinger, A.L. & Maennig, W. (2009) Investment in stadia and regional 
economic development – Evidence from FIFA World Cup 2006. International Journal of Sport 
Finance, 4(4), 221–239.  
Feddersen, A., Maennig, W. & Borcherding, M. (2006). New stadia for the World Cup 2006 in 
Germany: Is the novelty effect big enough? International Journal of Sport Finance, 1(3), 174–
188.  
FIFA. (2002). The 2010 FIFA World Cup: Bidding process opens. Media Release, 23 October.  
FIFA. (2007). Rotation ends in 2018. Media Release, 29 October. 
 
24 
FIFA. (2011a). Financial Report 2010, presented at the 61st FIFA Congress, Zurich, Switzerland, 
31 May–1 June.  
FIFA. (2011b). Almost half the world tuned in at home to watch 2010 FIFA World Cup South 
Africa. Media Release, July 11. 
Floros, C. (2010). The impact of the Athens Olympic Games on the Athens stock exchange. 
Journal of Economic Studies, 37(6), 647–665. 
Godinho, P. & Cerqueira, P. (2018). The impact of expectations, match importance, and results 
in the stock prices of European football teams. Journal of Sports Economics, 19(2), 230–278. 
Golez, B. & Koudijs, P. (2018). Four centuries of return predictability. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 127(2), 248–263. 
Gratton, C., Shibli, S. & Coleman, R. (2006). The economic impact of major sports events: A 
review of ten events in the UK. The Sociological Review, 54(2), 41–58. 
Grossman, S.J. & Stiglitz, J.E. (1980). On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets. 
The American Economic Review, 70(3), 393–408. 
Gunnarsson, B.B. (2018). The economics of World Cup 2018. Islandsbanki Research Report, 
May. 
Hansen, P.R. & Lunde, A. (2005). A forecast comparison of volatility models: Does anything beat 
a GARCH (1, 1)? Journal of Applied Econometrics, 20(7), 873–889. 
Hayward, M.L.A. (2002). When do firms learn from their acquisition experience? Evidence from 
1990–1995. Strategic Management Journal, 23(1), 21–40. 
Hill, H.H. (2000). Mega-events, urban boosterism and growth strategies: An analysis of the 
objectives and legitimations of the Cape Town 2004 Olympic bid. International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research, 24(2), 439–458. 
HSRC (Human Sciences Research Council). (2011). FIFA 2010 World Cup legacy audit: Final 
report. Report prepared for the Department of Sport and Recreation, Republic of South Africa, 
May. 
Jensen, M.C. (1978). Some anomalous evidence regarding market efficiency. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 6(2), 95–101. 
Kanas, A. (1998). Volatility spillovers across equity markets: European evidence. Applied 
Financial Economics, 8(3), 245–256. 
Kaplanski, G. & Levy, H. (2010). Exploitable predictable irrationality: The FIFA World Cup effect 
on the U.S. stock market. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 45(2), 535–553. 
Kasimati, E. (2003). Economic aspects and the Summer Olympics: A review of related research. 
International Journal of Tourism Research, 5(6), 433–444. 
Kothari, S.P. & Warner, J. B. (2006). Econometrics of event studies. In B. Espen Eckbo (Ed.), 
Handbook of corporate finance: Empirical corporate finance, Vol. 1 (pp.3– 36). Amsterdam: 
North Holland.  
Kun, S.I., Dow, K.W. & Grover, V. (2001). Research report: A re-examination of IT investment 
and the market value of the firm: An event study methodology. Information Systems Research 
Journal, 12(1), 103–117. 
Lee, P.M. (2001). What’s in a name.com? The effects of ‘com’ name changes on stock prices 
and trading activity. Strategic Management Journal, 22(8): 793–804. 
Leeds, M.A., Mirikitani, J. M. & Tang, D. (2009). Rational exuberance? An event analysis of the 
2008 Olympic announcements. International Journal of Sport Finance, 4(1), 5–15. 
Lepp, A. & Gibson, H. (2011). Reimaging a nation: South Africa and the 2010 FIFA World Cup. 
Journal of Sport & Tourism, 16(3), 211–230. 
Lintner, J. (1965). The valuation of risky assets and the selection of risky investments in stock 
portfolios and capital budgets. Review of Economics and Statistics, 47(1), 13–37. 
Liu, Y. (2011). The 2000 and 2008 Olympic host announcements and Chinese stock market 
response. International Journal of Applied Economics, 8(2), 43–62. 
Lo, A.W. & MacKinlay, A.C. (1988). Stock market prices do not follow random walks: Evidence 
from a simple specification test. Review of Financial Studies, 1(1), 41–66. 
MacKinlay, A.C. (1997). Event studies in economics and finance. Journal of Economic Literature, 
35(1), 13–39. 
 
25 
Madden, J.R. (2002). The economic consequences of the Sydney Olympics: The CREA/Arthur 
Andersen study. Current Issues in Tourism, 5(1), 7–20.  
Maennig, W. & Du Plessis, S. (2007). World Cup 2010: South African economic perspectives 
and policy challenges informed by the experience of Germany 2006. Contemporary Economic 
Policy, 25(4), 578–590. 
Martins, A.M. & Serra, A.D. (2011). Market impact of international sporting and cultural events. 
Journal of Economics and Finance, 35(4), 382–416. 
Matheson, V. (2009). Economic multipliers and mega-event analysis. International Journal of 
Sport Finance, 4(1), 63–70. 
McWilliams, A. & Siegel D. (1997). Event studies in management research: Theoretical and 
empirical issues. Academy of Management Journal, 40(3), 626–657. 
Mirman, M. & Sharma, R. (2010). Stock market reaction to Olympic Games announcement. 
Applied Economics Letters, 17(5), 463–466. 
Mlonzi, V.F., Kruger, J. & Nthoesane, M.G. (2011). Share price reaction to earnings 
announcement on the JSE-AltX: A test for market efficiency. Southern Business Review, 
15(3), 142–166. 
Muth, J.F. (1961). Rational expectations and the theory of price movements. Econometrica, 
29(3), 315–335. 
Nauright, J. (2004). Global games: Culture, political economy and sport in the globalised world of 
the 21st century. Third World Quarterly, 25(7), 1325–1336. 
Nelson, D.B. (1991). Conditional heteroskedasticity in asset returns: A new approach. 
Econometrica, 59(2), 347–370. 
Nishio, T., Lim, C. & Downward, P. (2009). Analysing the economic impact of the Olympics using 
stock market indices of host countries. In R. S. Anderssen, R. D. Braddock, & L.T.H. Newham 
(Eds.), Proceedings of the 18th World ISAM/MODSIM Congress (pp. 1258–1264), Cairns, 
Australia, 13–17 July. 
Obi, P., Surujlal, J. & Okubena, O. (2009). South African equity market reactions to the 2010 
World Cup announcement. African Journal for Physical, Health Education, Recreation and 
Dance, 9, Suppl. 1, 284–296. 
Payne, B.C., Tresl, J. & Friesen, G.C. (2018). Sentiment and stock returns: anticipating a major 
sporting event. Journal of Sports Economics, 19(6), 843–872. 
Philpott, M. F. & Firer, C. (1994). Share price anomalies and the efficiency of the JSE. 
Investment Analysts Journal, 23(40), 39–51. 
Porter, P.K. (1999). Mega-sports events as municipal investments: A critique of impact analysis. 
In J. Fizel, E. Gustafson, & L. Hadley (Eds.), Sports economics: Current research (pp. 61–73). 
Westport, CT: Praeger. 
Preuss, H. (2011). A method for calculating the crowding-out effect in sport mega-event impact 
studies: The 2010 FIFA World Cup. Development Southern Africa, 28(3), 367–385. 
Ramdas, B., Van Gaalen, R. & Bolton, J. (2015). The announcement impact of hosting the FIFA 
World Cup on host country stock markets. Procedia Economics and Finance, 30(1), 226–238. 
Roche, M. (2000). Mega-events and modernity: Olympics and expos in the growth of global 
culture. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Ross, S.A. (1977). The arbitrage theory of capital asset pricing. Journal of Economic Theory, 
13(3), 341–360. 
Ryan, P. & Taffler, R.J. (2004). Are economically significant stock returns and trading volumes 
driven by firm-specific news. Releases? Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 31(1), 
49-82. 
Samitas, A.G. & Kenourgios, D.F. (2004). Market efficiency and signaling: An event study 
analysis for Athens Stock Exchange. Proceedings of the 1st Applied Financial Economics 
(AFE) International Conference on Advances in Applied Financial Economics (pp. 163–175), 
Samos, Greece, 28–30 May. 
Sharma, R. (2010). Stock market impact of the International Cricket Council’s decision to 
reallocate 2011 World Cup matches. Sport in Society, 13(6), 1027–1034. 
Sharpe, W.F. (1964). Capital asset prices: A theory of market equilibrium under conditions of 
risk. Journal of Finance, 19(3), 425–442. 
 
26 
Smith, B. & Krige, N. (2010). National sporting success and investor optimism. University of 
Stellenbosch Business School (USB) Leaders’ Lab, 4(2), 18–21. 
Smith, G. & Dyakova, A. (2014). African stock markets: Efficiency and relative predictability. 
South African Journal of Economics, 82(2), 258–275. 
South Africa. Department of Sport and Recreation. (2011). The 2010 FIFA World Cup country 
report. Pretoria: SRSA. 
Stankeviþienơ, J. & Akelaitisb, S. (2014). Impact of public announcements on stock prices: 
relation between values of stock prices and the price changes in Lithuanian stock market. 
Procedia: Social and Behavioral Sciences, 156, 538-542. 
Sterken, E. (2006). Growth impact of major sporting events. European Sport Management 
Quarterly, 6(4), 375–389. 
Szymanski, S. (2002). The economic impact of the World Cup. World Economics, 3(1), 169–177. 
Van Wyk, J. (2008). The 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa: The politics of hosting a mega 
international event. World Journal of Managing Events, 2(1), 1–9. 
Wang, Z., Salin, V., Hooker, N.H. & Leatham, D. (2002). Stock market reaction to food recalls: A 
GARCH application. Applied Economics Letters, 9(15), 979–987. 
Witt, S.F. (1988). Mega-events and mega-attractions. Tourism Management, 9(1), 76–77. 
 
 
 
Authors’ note 
We thank the editor of this journal and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. 
